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Abstract
We construct a new, comprehensive instrument-level database of sovereign debt for 18 advanced
and emerging countries during 1913–46, an eventful period characterized by notoriously high debt
levels. This database is thus the first to provide public debt time series with such a high degree
of comparability across countries and time. Documentation of qualitative instrument characteristics
offers unique insights about the debt management policies that were implemented and the broader
policies they helped finance. We document how interwar governments rolled over debts that were
largely unsustainable and how the external public debt network contributed to the collapse of the
international financial system in the early 1930s.
JEL classification: E6, F5, H6, N10
Keywords: Economic History, Debt Policy, Public Finance, Macroeconomics
∗nend@imf.org
†The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the imf, its Executive
Board, or imf management.
1
1 Introduction—Making bricks without clay
Governments’ liabilities are complex and involve different types of securities, domestic and external com-
mitments, with varied characteristics (e.g., denomination, maturity, coupon rates, and marketability).
Even under benign economic conditions, public debt management requires a deep understanding of these
elements to ensure that governments can borrow when they need to and that the sovereign is not overly
exposed to risks. Debt management practices are more complicated during times of high and rising debt
levels and when global interconnectedness is high. From this perspective, the interwar period, the focus
of our paper, lends itself as a natural case study for investigating debt management.
The interwar period was rich in macroeconomic events, including times of hyperinflation, deflation,
depression, liquidity constraints, debt conversions, and debt defaults. It was a transition period between
two international monetary systems and a laboratory for experiments in adjusting monetary and foreign
exchange rate policies and regulating the global financial and trade architecture.
However, since this period was politically and economically turbulent, available data on sovereign debt
are often sparse, aggregated or hard to interpret. Even so, several researchers have compiled historical
databases on public finance, enabling a review of past policies and comparisons with present day. These
studies typically rely on country-specific sources to compile fiscal and debt aggregates.1 Yet they do not
account for the fact that in the past national statistics varied greatly in terms of definitions and that it
was not uncommon for countries to manipulate definitions over time to serve political purposes or conceal
problems.2 This absence of generally-accepted statistical standards to ensure comparability of aggregates
can obscure cross-country comparisons. The coverage of aggregate debt data also varies across time and
countries.
This paper describes a new historical database on public debt for 18 countries, which adds to existing
databases in two ways. First, we provide instrument-level data on debt issued domestically and abroad for a
relatively large group of countries. Second, we construct public debt aggregates using this instrument-level
data. We believe that this database is not only rich in detail, but allows for a greater degree of comparability
of aggregates across countries. The debt security can be thought of as a common denominator of public
finance across countries for this period, providing objective, contractual, cash-based information on public
debt and fiscal policy. This is because a debt contract by its very nature corresponds to a series of
1. We refer the reader to Abbas et al. (2011, pp.719–20) for a broad review of databases on public debt published up to
2010. Since then, there have been others, including Abbas et al. (2010), C. M. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), C. M. Reinhart,
V. R. Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012), Abbas et al. (2014), Mauro et al. (2015), and Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017). While
these databases cover more countries and a longer timeframe than we do, they focus on debt-to-GDP ratios, with aggregate
breakdowns (external vs. domestic and long vs. short-term). The World Wars and interwar period are generally covered
with substantial gaps; and since historical GDP statistics are heuristic and of varying quality, we argue that debt ratios are
not reliable.
2. In the interwar period, we came across examples of countries falsifying central bank balance sheets, concealing debt
service costs in other spending items, and modifying the length of fiscal years.
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predictable cash flows. By contrast, aggregate debt data is less reliable because its coverage varies across
time and country. As for flow data, such as spending and revenue, it was generally presented in budgeted
terms as opposed to the amounts actually spent or collected. Budgets were also often scattered across
different accounts, as special accounts were common practice, making consolidation of the overall budget
a difficult exercise, particularly a century later.
The resulting database (the interwar debt database, or idd, henceforth) contains data on amounts
outstanding for some 3,800 individual debt instruments as well as detailed instrument-level characteristics.
The latter include the nature of the instrument, coupon rates (the nominal interest payment promised on
issuance, excluding the various premia that were often granted upon issuance or redemption), maturity
dates, currency denomination, and taxation regimes. From an international perspective, the database also
sheds light on who owed what, and to whom (that is, to which country). To our knowledge, this is the first
cross-country database that captures instrument-level information on debt obligations for a large sample
of countries and for the entire gamut of debt instruments.3
The period is limited to 1913–1946, but we focus on 18 key economies that provide a reasonable
geographic coverage and constitute majority of public debt issued in the interwar period.4 The focus on
sovereign bonds is appealing as bonds, and particularly sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds, constituted a
large share of financial instruments, both domestically and internationally (Eichengreen and Portes 1989).5
The qualitative information included in the database provides useful information about the nature of the
public debt instruments and the purpose for which they were issued, thereby giving useful insights about
policies that were pursued. The idd complements existing databases by improving the breadth and depth
of instrument coverage and addressing data gaps (especially the two World Wars). Section 2 describes the
idd, while the extensive appendices documents precisely the data compilation strategy.
During the interwar period, sovereign debt in most countries was sizable and comprised a large number
of instruments. The level of detail contained in the idd provides new insights on debt management in the
interwar period—for example, what types of instruments were most widely issued, what was the maturity
structure of debt, in what currency public debt was denominated, and what kind of incentives were offered
to bondholders. Studying debt instruments offers new insights on debt management policies, while the
literature usually considers debt management either irrelevant or a question of maturity and currency.6
3. G. J. Hall and T. J. Sargent (2015) and G. Hall, Payne, T. Sargent, et al. (2018) compile instrument-level information
on government debt for the U.S. over the period 1776–1960. Ellison and Scott (2019) construct a dataset for public debt
over the period 1694–2017 for each individual bond issued in the U.K.. Kaminsky (2017) and Meyer, C. M. Reinhart,
and Trebesch (2019) compile cross-country instrument-level data, but only for external debt bonds that were traded on
international markets.
4. In 1935, for example, our sample covers some 88 percent of the total debt reported in the League of Nations publications
5. Equity markets were much less developed and syndicated bank lending did not yet generalize; the gold standard period
is thus often described as the era of bond finance—even firms primarily financed their investment projects through debt
(Mitchener and Weidenmier 2010).
6. This is a consequence of term structure formulas à la Hicks (1939). The irrelevance of debt management also arises
from Barro’s (1974) Ricardian equivalence proposition, which postulates that it is irrelevant whether the government decides
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As summarized by T. J. Sargent (1993), this irrelevance no longer holds when taxes are accounted for
(Missale 1997) and when the government operates under imperfect commitment, so that the risk premium
increases with debt maturity. Debt also implicitly constrains the set of tax policy choices available to
future governments. In other words, debt management matters when the government’s credibility—about
future taxes or future inflation—is in question or when taxes are distortionary. This was clearly the case
for many countries in the interwar period.
Moreover, debt management matters for political economy reasons. First, it implicitly constrains
the set of tax policy choices available to future governments Lucas and Stokey (1983). Second, debt
management underpins liquidity and interest rate risks (through the structure of future payments that
the government contractually commits to)—as opposed to sustainability risk (the ability to eventually
repay the stock). In other words, debt management is important to level off promised repayment cash
flows, while fiscal policy cares about the level and dynamics of public debt. Third, investors seem to
care about bond design—this was well-acknowledged by interwar governments. Andritzky (2012) shows
that the composition of bondholders influences bond pricing. Fourth, the choice between foreign and
domestic bonds entailed tapping very different sorts of markets. Foreign capital markets were relatively
sophisticated and careful (see End (2019a) and Metzler (2006) for an account of the Morgan’s intrusion
into Japan’s domestic polciies), whereas domestic investors were generally captive, not as well-informed
(Bassetto and Galli 2017), and vulnerable to inflation or financial repression.
We show how interwar governments rolled over debts that were largely unsustainable (subsection 3.1).
We find clear signs that governments faced persistent sustainability and liquidity issues during the period
and could roll over their debt and their ambitious spending plans only through the segmentation of their
investor base, the adoption of credibility-enhancing devices, and the complacent support of their central
banks. The wide variety of debt instruments issued during the interwar suggests that the design of
debt instruments in terms of promised cash flows and embedded options matters—especially so when
the investor base is segmented and when governments fail to credibly secure towards debt sustainability.
Debt management in the interwar period entailed pursuing different objectives: enhancing the credibility
of sovereign bonds, managing short-term financing pressures, and financing ambitious spending defense
and social programs. Central banks also played a significantly supportive role, which highlights fiscal
dominance.7
Using graph (network) analysis, we then examine the structure and evolution of the external public
debt network, initially generated by World War I (wwi) and reparation loans (subsection 3.2). Sovereign
debt was issued abroad in significant amounts. The accumulation of foreign sovereign debt by France,
Germany, Italy, the U.K., and several smaller European and Commonwealth countries generated a vast
international network, with significant implications for many private investors, governments, and central
to finance itself using debt or taxes, or whether the government borrows using short-term or long-term debt. Theories of
optimal debt management hinge on failures of one or more of the assumptions underpinning this proposition.
7. Further research could investigate whether a specific combination of debt instruments, financial repression, or debt
restructuring affected debt sustainability, and could inform current episodes of fiscal stress.
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banks in the world. We document how the structural weaknesses of this network contributed to the
collapse of the international financial system in the early 1930s. Absent thorough statistical reporting,
contemporaries probably failed to acknowledge how entangled the sovereign debt network had become.
Such a systematic analysis of the public debt network could not be undertaken without instrument-level
information. In our view, this is another contribution of this paper to the literature, which bridges the
gap between two separate streams of research: the one about the international financial system around the
Great Depression and that about war debt sustainability. We draw heavily from the narrative developed
in Dabla-Norris et al. (2019).
2 The Interwar Debt Data—Elements of Art
2.1 Methodology
This subsection outlines our broad methodological approach to compiling the idd (Figure 1). More details
are provided in Appendices A–E.
Figure 1: Data collection strategy for each country
We took the League of Nations publications as a starting point to construct the idd. The League
compiled information on public finances for about 60 countries over the 1913–1946 period. The data on
public debt, in particular, are quite detailed, with amounts outstanding reported for various instruments
and debt aggregates. Figure 2 provides a snapshot of a public debt table for the U.K.: in addition to
aggregates such as domestic and floating debt (i.e., short-term debt of maturity that is usually two years
or less), the tables published by the League of Nations would also include amounts outstanding for each
instrument (for example, “4% Victory Bonds”).
To compile such data, the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service of the League (in many
ways a precursor to the International Monetary Fund) sent regular questionnaires for countries to complete.
Countries used information from several sources, including national accounts, budgetary accounts, central
5
Figure 2: A snapshot of a League of Nations table on public debt
Source: lon (1923b)
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bank reports, and statistical yearbooks. This created several statistical challenges, which include varying
definitions of fiscal years, different recording standards for revenue and expenditure items (cash versus
commitment bases, gross versus net), lack of comprehensiveness of national budgets, and nature of the
national debt figures.8 For national debt data in particular, the League highlighted two reasons that
make international comparisons difficult: (1) there are differences in what various countries included in
their aggregates for public debt (i.e., inclusion or otherwise of debts of special funds, debts to national
banks, etc.), and (2) there are differences in how public debt is organized into various classifications (i.e.,
domestic versus foreign debt, classifications according to currency of issue, classifications according to terms
of repayment, etc.). The idd circumvents a bulk of these issues by focusing explicitly on instrument-level
data.
Despite the League of Nations’ efforts to produce regular and comprehensive coverage of public debt
statistics, there were gaps in reporting. In most cases, there are years for which amounts of debt outstand-
ing are not reported or disaggregated information is unavailable (such as “Treasury bills” in Figure 2). To
fill these gaps, we supplemented the League of Nations data with several other sources. These typically
consisted of national sources, such as budget documents, statistical yearbooks and other specific resources
(an exhaustive list of sources is in Appendix A).
Where even additional sources were insufficient to fill the gaps, we used inference and interpolation
methods. We also decided to convert fiscal years into calendar years and all amounts into common
currencies to ensure cross-country comparability. Details are in Appendix B.
The final step in the data compilation strategy for the interwar database was to use Moody’s publica-
tions and national sources to obtain qualitative information for each instrument. Taking once again the
example of the U.K. ’s 4-percent Victory Bond, Moody’s provided additional information for this instru-
ment, such as interest payable, maturity, rating, whether the instrument had a sinking fund, and where
it was listed. Although Moody’s publications covered a significant portion of the instruments included
in the idd, it excluded information on instruments that were not traded on the largest stock exchanges
or instruments that were of less interest to the American investors (Moody’s target audience).9 In these
instances, we used the alternative sources listed in Appendix A.
Although the idd is a fairly comprehensive database, some caveats apply.
1. The idd is based on the amount outstanding concept of government debt debt (reported in the
database in local currency units, U.S. dollars, or gold equivalent), not themarket value of government
debt. Collecting price data for the individual instruments included in the idd requires more extensive
8. See for example the methodological notes in lon (1922b, 1924c).
9. For instance, nominative bonds (which were sold over the counter; Thomson and Christian 1911), pension-like instru-
ments, annuities, or debt issued through state-owned enterprises or banks.
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efforts that fall beyond the scope of this paper. There are recent studies focusing on single countries
that provide instrument-level price and quantity data10
2. The idd does not include information on the ownership of the individual instruments either. We
do, however, supplement idd data with detailed information on central bank balance sheets for the
countries included in the database (Appendix E). This gives an idea about the extent of central bank
exposure to sovereigns and fiscal dominance during the interwar period.
3. Some information included in the idd remains incomplete despite our best efforts. Data quality is
inevitably worse during times of war and political tensions. Many interwar governments also hid or
misreported items they felt uncomfortable disclosing.
Nevertheless, we still consider the idd as the best starting point for research on individual bonds and debt
management practices for a wide range of countries during the interwar period.
2.2 Resulting database
The idd covers 18 countries for the period 1913–1946. Some salient features of the idd are discussed in
this subsection, thereby showcasing the various characteristics of instruments included in the idd, details
of which are presented in Appendices C–D.11
Country coverage. Our choice of countries was strategic. First, we picked countries for which the
lon provided relatively long times series and that also had a comparatively large cross-section of debt
instruments. Our initial focus were Western European countries, the U.S., Japan, and selected members
of the British Commonwealth.12 Therefore, the database includes countries that were considered the
biggest players at the time, while also making room for other countries which were not as covered as
comprehensively in other studies on histories of public debt (e.g. Japan and some of the Commonwealth
countries). All in all, the idd has a reasonable geographic coverage while also accounting for majority of
public debt issued in the interwar period (Figure 3a).13 In terms of contributions to global debt in the
interwar period, Europe and the Americas were by far the two most dominant regions (Figure 3b).
Instruments. Public debt in this database refers to debt contractually incurred by the central gov-
ernment of a country. This definition excludes municipal and other sub-central government debts, as
well as debt merely guaranteed by the government. The idd contains some 3,800 individual debt instru-
10. For example, G. J. Hall and T. J. Sargent (2015) and G. Hall, Payne, T. Sargent, et al. (2018) compile detailed data
on the market value of debt for the U.S. and Ellison and Scott (2019) for the U.K..
11. But this is a non-exhaustive list of lenses to examine public debt: since the idd includes data on individual instruments,
other representations of interwar debt are also possible.
12. Dabla-Norris et al. (2019) studies in-depth the history of public debt in some of these countries.
13. For example, some 88 percent of the total debt reported by the League of Nations for 1935 was that of the 18 countries
in our sample.
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Figure 3: Country coverage
(a) Countries and country codes (b) Total sovereign debt, by region
Note: In this paper, we use gold as the common currency, as this was the reference at the time; even countries outside of
the gold standard used gold in the formulation of their monetary policy and diplomatic negotiations. This also prevents us
from choosing a reference currency to describe a period where leading international currencies competed for that status.
ments, which were classified into eight different types, defined by the nature of promised cash flows (see
Appendix C for details):14
Bond Debt instrument that obligated the government to two types of cash flow: (1) a principal when
the bonds were presented to the paying agent on or after their maturity date; (2) interest payments
when attached coupons were presented to the paying agent.
Perpetual These instruments, also called consols or rentes, had no maturity date, which means that the
principal was never paid unless the government or the bondholder activated their potential options
to redeem it.
Bill These are debt instruments without coupons, generally with a shorter-term maturity than bonds. The
interest was implicitly or explicitly pre-counted, that is, deducted upfront, as a discount between
the issue price and the principal.
Credit These instruments were generally contracted with financial institutions or in the form of bilateral
trade credits and entailed annual payments of some principal and interest. They came in the form
of either one-off borrowing, or as lines of credit on which governments could draw on demand.
Advance These financing facilities were arranged with local bodies, government departments (e.g., Trea-
sury, central bank), savings banks, or foreign authorities. They generally involved a low or null
interest rate, and an open-ended maturity.
14. The LoN standard classification, as reflected in the questionnaire they would prepare for data collections, mixes consid-
erations for residency, maturity, redeemability, and whether the debt was funded or floating. Another classification is Tobin
(1963)’s: (a) transferable demand obligations, (b) marketable short-term securities, (c) marketable long-term securities, (d)
non-marketable securities, and (e) other commitments (such as pensions or social security benefits). Interestingly, both
classifications can be retrieved by combining several descriptors of our database.
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Account Governments often had access to demand or term deposits. This instrument is similar to a credit
line, but it is up to the account owner (e.g., public companies) to change the outstanding amounts.
Annuity Annual budget payments could be pledged by law (e.g., compensation for old-age or war pensions)
and were recorded as capitalized annuities. It differs from a perpetual because the annual payment
is not a contractual coupon rate, but a lump-sum allocated in each annual budget.
Other Public debt instruments or aggregates for which no decomposition was possible fit in none of the
above categories (e.g., arrears).
Although bonds were most popular, other instruments such as bills, advances and perpetuals also featured
in the interwar period (Figure 4). Shorter-term instruments, such as bills and advances, were used in
difficult financial circumstances.
Figure 4: Typology of instruments
(a) Number of instruments by country (b) Total debt by instrument
Instrument characteristics. The database contains a wealth of detailed information on character-
istics of individual instruments (see Appendix D for details).
Residency and currency. As today, there is only anecdotal information about sovereign bond ownership.
However, it appears that interwar governments segmented and tailor-made their debt instruments to
specific investor bases. Consequently, we can as a first approximation assume that the currency of issuance
of an instrument was a good indication of where it was held. In particular, we classify a security as “foreign”
when it was issued mainly on foreign stock exchanges, in foreign currency, or with exchange rate guarantees
(typically, a “gold clause”). Majority of the bonds were issued in the United Kingdom and United States.
Although the latter gained prominence at the start of wwi, it was not until the mid-1930s that United
States overtook the United Kingdom as a dominant market (Figure 5a).
Coupon rates. Almost half the debt between 1920 and 1930 had coupon rates of 5 percent or higher
(Figure 5b). Low-coupon debts (or prepaid interest bills) represented a large number of instruments but
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only a small portion of the outstanding amount of debt.15 However, average coupon rates decreased in
the 1930s as financial repression policies were implemented by many interwar governments.
Figure 5: Breakdown by residency and coupon rate
(a) Decomposition by residency (b) Coupon rates
Notes: All charts in this section are based on the entire database, excluding instruments for which the examined
characteristic is unknown. Precisely, the formulas used for numbers and amounts at time t of all instruments i having a
characteristic Xi = x are respectively: Dx,t =
∑
i|Xi=xDi,t and Nx,t =
∑
i|Xi=x and Di,t 6=0 ωi,t. We need indeed to account
for the fact that some countries have lots of small instruments, while other focus on a handful of large issuances. Hence, we
weigh observations using a country-specific weight ωi,t = |{j|Cj = Ci and Dj,t 6= 0 and Xj is known}|−1 where Ci is the
country that issued i and | · | is the cardinality function. Lines represent numbers, shaded areas amounts.
The “unknown” category includes indexed or floating rates—typically, this is the case for credit lines or short-term T-bills
for which we do not have the breakdown by instrument.
Maturity. Longer-term maturity debt dominated the first half of the interwar period (with perpetuals
and maturities above 20 years). However, governments were progressively issuing more shorter-term debt
into the 1940s (Figure 6).
Redeemability. Since debt instruments were largely very long term, they contained an embedded option,
for either the government or the lender to trigger principal repayment earlier than maturity. This was
necessary for the government to be able to restructure its debt, smooth its repayment profile, and ensure
some liquidity for investors, as secondary markets were underdeveloped. Government’s early redemption
could involve lotteries or randomization, as well as generosity when computing the current latent value of
the bond. More than half of the instruments in the idd, in value, were redeemable (Figure 7a).
Sinking fund. Permanent or funded debt was usually debt for which a sinking (redemption) fund had
the liability to pay the interest. This was an important feature that helped in placing long-term bonds
because it served as a commitment-enhancing mechanism. Earmarked revenues or budget transfers were
allocated to these funds. During the interwar period, these mechanisms were instrumental in enhancing
the credibility of public debt management. Almost half of the instruments in the idd for which information
was available had sinking funds (Figure 7b).
15. These instruments were likely used as adjustment variables.
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Figure 6: Debt instruments by maturity
(a) Amounts (b) Number of instruments
Note: Roll refers to instruments that were issued on tap and often renewed automatically unless lenders opted out.
Figure 7: Debt instruments by maturity
(a) Redeemable versus non-redeemable instruments (b) Debt with sinking fund (in percent of total debt)
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Tax. Tax incentives to hold sovereign debt were common at the beginning of the interwar period but
became progressively less important (Figure 8a). Tax exemptions could be granted for interest gains under
the income tax or for capital gains related to holding sovereign bonds; blanket exemptions were almost
always granted to foreign bondholders. Such tax incentives changed the debt instruments’ effective rate
of return.
Purpose. Interwar governments often earmarked a specific instrument to a specific purpose, as par-
liaments often had to approve each issuance. This was also a marketing tool for investors, who liked to
know what they were contributing to finance (e.g., war or liberty loans). Figure 8b provides a broad
categorization of the purposes for which debt was issued. Unsurprisingly, war and reconstruction took the
lion’s share of financing resources during the interwar period. By contrast, the number of bonds that were
explicitly issued to support banks through the banking crises that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s does
not stand out, but the related amounts provide a rough quantification of the fiscal cost of these banking
crises.
Figure 8: Debt instruments by maturity
(a) Taxable instruments (in percent of total debt) (b) Purpose of public debt (in percent of total debt)
3 Debt and Credibility Management during the interwar—Stone lace
and walls of light
In this section, we use the idd to illustrate how, from houses of financial cards, governments were able
to build cathedrals of public debt. Interwar governments uncannily rolled over overwhelming war-related
debts, infringing on any liquidity and sustainability limits. External indebtedness was an unavoidable
component of the toolkit used by governments to maintain debt credibility in the midst of large shocks,
even though currencies were not as well anchored by the gold standard as beforewwi. We look successively
at: (1) how interwar governments rolled over debts that were largely unsustainable, and (2) the manner
13
in which the external public debt network contributed to the collapse of the international financial system
in the early 1930s.
3.1 Managing rollover risks and reputation in the interwar period
3.1.1 Public debt unsustainability—a house of cards?
Interwar governments regularly faced liquidity and refinancing issues (Dabla-Norris et al. 2019). Financing
would dry up during confidence crises or international financial tightening episodes, and governments
would struggle to smooth out the maturity structure of their public debt portfolio. Most countries ended
wwi with a massive stock of public debt, often exceeding their national income and revenues by several
multiples. Was public debt unsustainable for many of the belligerent countries in the interwar period?
There is no easy answer to this question as a universally acceptable indicator of fiscal sustainability does
not exist.
In Appendix G, we draw on sustainability tests from the empirical literature to show that public
debt was unsustainable for most belligerent countries.16 We first we run stationarity tests on our series of
government debt for each country, as well as panel unit root tests. We then use Bohn (1998)’s sustainability
criterion, which is based on a time series regression of the primary surplus of debt on public debt and
other controls for each of the countries in our sample. Our results suggest that for most countries in our
sample, the response of the primary fiscal surplus to variation in our measure of government debt was not
consistent with meeting the intertemporal budget constraint, and the debt ratio was not stationary.
The idd also sheds light on how governments managed the imminent refinancing needs that they
faced—the so-called wall of money that contemporary commentators described.17 As shown in Figure
4 9, the short-term debt-servicing needs were sizable, representing 2 billion of gold ounces in the overall
international system (or two fifths of 1920 U.S. GDP). This raises several questions: were short-term
financing needs so large because average maturity was short, interest payments were large, or governments
were simply too indebted? The idd allows us to compile average maturities and effective interest rates to
address these questions.
To proxy effective interest rates since interwar budgets did not report debt service consistently, we
average the coupons serviced by each instrument. Figure 10a demonstrates on a European sample how
the average rate could vary and differ across sovereigns. However, the resulting rates are surprisingly
low, by comparison with levels sometimes observed today. This is in part because bond payoffs included
16. These are distinct from insolvency tests; they test whether current fiscal and debt policies were unsustainable rather
than the immediate ability to face financing needs.
17. For example, Sauvy (1965).
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Figure 9: International financing deeds
Note: Shaded areas are for wwi and wwii.
other forms of remuneration than coupons.18 Further, some countries relied on monetary policy incentives
to issue discounted short-term Treasury bills, which do not carry any coupon—these instruments were
typically used by central and commercial banks for liquidity management purposes.19
As for maturity, there are different ways to envisage the maturity of a security D issued in t0. First, the
contractual maturity is τ = tf − t0 where tf is the latest payment date (typically, when all the principal
has been paid back). This measure underpins the general classification of short-term versus long-term
bonds. Second, at any point in time t, it is possible to account for the remaining maturity tf − t. Third,
duration is a measure of the average maturity of all future cash flows, weighted by these cash flows. For a
bullet bond, duration and maturity are identical. Figure 10b plots two maturity measures at the aggregate
level.20 We find that, even though average maturity declined throughout the interwar period (especially
during the war when emergency short-term financing had to be promptly tapped), maturities were much
longer than those found today in most emerging countries.
18. For instance, the dollar-indexed zero-coupon Treasury bills that Germany issued during the hyper-inflationary period
promised to repay the indexed principal with a premium. The latter could in some instances be as high as 70 percent, which,
for a maturity of twelve years, and leaving aside compounding, roughly corresponds to a 6 percent annual interest rate.
19. It is well-documented that the Austrian and German Finance Ministries forced their central banks to hold large amounts
of such discounted Treasury bills during the period of high inflation/hyperinflation. This explains the low average coupon
rate for these two countries on Figure 10a.
20. To aggregate the maturity of a debt portfolio composed of nt instruments (Dit)1≤i≤nt , we weigh each instrument by
its outstanding amount. Therefore, the weighted average maturity is WAMt =
∑
i τiDit∑
iDit
; and the remaining maturity is
WARM =
∑
i(tif−t)Dit∑
iDit
.
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Figure 10: Liquidity Indicators
(a) Average coupon rate (in percent) (b) Average maturity (in years)
Note: Coupon rates are weighted by the outstanding amounts of the respective instruments. Only those instruments with
available coupon information are part of the average. WAM (WARM) = weighted average (remaining) maturity.
3.1.2 Credibility-enhancing devices and financial innovation
How did countries manage to roll over unsustainable public debts, while doling out new and costly spending
(either social protection policies or military spending)? One piece of the answer lies in debt management
policy choices and the design of debt instruments. While financial market development in the second half
of the twentieth century contributed to the creation of new financial instruments, debt practices today use
fewer and simpler instruments than they did in the past. The wide variety of bonds during the interwar
period is evidence that bond engineering sophistication played a role.
The methods used to sell domestic debt were similar across countries (M. Dornbusch, R. Dornbusch,
Draghi, et al. 1990). The Treasury and the central bank would organize auctions to place long-term debt,
announce the rate to be paid, and hold the subscription open for a given period. By contrast, T-bills would
be continuously on sale (on tap) at predetermined rates of interest. In-kind payment was possible for both
types of debt, namely, using older bonds to subscribe to new ones, sometimes at a discount. External
debts, apart from intergovernmental debts and small bank credits, were mostly in the form of syndicated
loans. Sovereign bond offerings would go through a lead underwriter and a consortium of banks, which
would help the government in exchange for a substantial commission.21
Bond design was often complex as bonds were tailor-made for different classes of investors, at odds with
today’s standardization of bonds.22 For instance, according to contemporary sources, short term bonds
21. Fees of 5 to 7 percent of the issued amount were common.
22. In France, for instance, the number of active public debt instruments was around 72 in 1938. By way of comparison, less
than ten different types of bonds feature on the website of France’s debt management office in 2019. This is not surprising
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were intended for institutional investors and perpetuities for small savers. Features such as lotteries,
perpetual annuities, indexation mechanisms, tax incentives, and premia also targeted different investors,
in a context where banking sectors were relatively small, money markets shallow, and private savings
primarily hoarded in cash. Marketing of public debt auctions was a crucial part of debt management
strategies. Many public bonds had a moniker or nickname, either related to specific events (Liberation
bonds) or purposes (conversion bond). Patriotic feelings were frequently invoked: financing the government
was marketed as a nationwide effort “for the motherland” (Figure 11).
Figure 11: Propaganda for the National Defense Loans by the Lyon Credit
Note: “Lyon Credit—Subscribe to the Fourth National Loan.” The reader will admire the simplicity of the allegory...
In terms of debt management, governments could not manage their debt portfolio or hedge risks as
actively as today, given relatively underdeveloped secondary markets. Interwar governments optimized
the debt profile through conversion operations and were able to secure relatively long average maturities
and low interest rates. When prevailing conditions were deemed favorable, long-term bonds were issued to
replace selected securities with higher coupon rate or shorter maturity. Preferential prices were generally
set to provide an incentive to subscribe and remit older securities.
Taking advantage of the granularity of our database, we can simulate what the expected debt service
structure was at any given point in time. This requires making some assumptions, as most instruments
when seen from the perspective of financial market development: the sovereign market usually matures first, targeting market
players’ needs, then private markets develop and the variety of sovereign instruments tends to decrease (Chami, Fullenkamp,
and Sharma 2010).
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included stochastic and discretionary elements. As an illustration, Figure 12 shows how the 1926 Poincaré
debt conversion in France succeeded in reducing short-term expected repayments by half. Implementing
such conversions was a common practice at the time as a means for governments to reprofile their debt
maturity structure and benefit from favorable market prices. Many sovereign bonds included a call option
that could be triggered in good times, in which case a markup was generally paid. Moral suasion and
premiums were also used to entice bondholders to swap old instruments for new ones. Less benign debt
conversions occurred as well in several countries on the eve of wwii, in conjunction with financial repression
(e.g., in Japan, Italy, and France).
Figure 12: The effect of the Poincaré conversion on expected debt service
Source: End (2019b)
Note: The plain/dotted bars show the expected debt service profile before/after the conversion.
Another perennial challenge was to convince creditors that the government would pay back debt—in
other words, how to establish the government’s credibility. As the average public debt maturity was quite
long, it was not only about the current government’s reputation; they needed to convince investors that
the debt contract would be honored, thereby tying the hands of future governments that would have to
service it. Adding a form of collateral (e.g., an implicit claim on future taxes through a sinking fund) to
the debt contract was used to lower the risk premium.
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The most formalized commitment mechanisms were sinking funds.23 Upon issuance, the government
would commit to paying back the bonds by provisioning a share of the budget surplus or tax revenues to
redeem the bonds in accordance with a pre-announced schedule. Typically, a price ceiling below which
the sinking funds were authorized to buy the bonds back was established.
But even without an explicit sinking fund, the government could commit, as part of a bond’s design, to
buy back (redeem) some of the principal regularly, with quantitative limits on how much the government
could call back at each period. These regular redemption payments helped to level off the amortization
schedule but also convince investors that governments were willing to repay. The desire to lengthen debt
maturity also underpinned the rationale for redemption funds. For investors to accept longer maturities,
bonds should generally be redeemable at predetermined rates long before maturity, and carry a higher
return the longer investors have held them (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Sharma 2010). The share of such
redeemable debt increased during the interwar period (Figure 13).
Figure 13: French public debt by redemption mechanism (in percent of total debt, 1913–45)
Source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2019)
Notes: Redeemable debt are bonds that the government had the option to amortize earlier than the face maturity, which
was usually permitted only after a contractual grace period. “Other” includes bonds for which no information is available.
Non-government public entities played also a role in rolling over the public debt. Public banks and cor-
porations were instrumental in canvassing investors, making the market for sovereign bonds, and smoothing
out confidence shocks. Public banks served as guarantors and played a promotional role in debt place-
23. The first occurrence of sinking fund in history can be traced back to Italian city-states in the 14th century. Richelieu
advocated such a sinking fund for sovereign debt to avoid costly and disruptive defaults, and Colbert was the first to attempt
it at the end of the 17th century.
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ments. Likewise, the government could utilize non-financial public companies to borrow on its behalf (the
epitome was Germany’sMefo bill scheme, involving the Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft company).24
The central bank played in most countries a key role as well. While the Treasury was the government’s
main financial representative and accountant in charge of debt issuance and service, the central bank
could assume several debt policy responsibilities. It provided deficit financing—directly through advances
and portfolio investments and through repurchase agreements. It behaved as the government’s broker,
leveraging its regional and foreign branches to promote sovereign paper, sometimes granting advances to
subscribers. It could commit financial repression or manipulation of security prices by intervening on the
market or changing its discount rate (especially ahead of conversions).
Bignon and Flandreau (2018) note that there were two alternative credibility models before wwi:
either the central bank was focused on monetary policy and the government relied on sinking funds;
or the central bank was actively involved in financing sovereign debt. War financing created the need
for both. Figure 14 uses our central bank balance sheet data to illustrate how central bank exposure to
government rose steadily in the interwar period. As the monetary policy standard was to adhere to the gold
standard (or a gold exchange standard), a large central bank exposure implied fiscal dominance. During
the interwar period, adherence to the monetary rule was “a good housekeeping seal of approval,” which
signaled to international capital markets that the country was committed to pursuing prudent monetary
and fiscal policies (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). Confidence that the value of the currency would be stable,
and particularly that debt would not be inflated away in the future, provided assurances to both domestic
and external creditors. Yet, fiscal dominance meant for the central bank the existence of multiple, possibly
contradicting objectives and a reputational cost—a tradeoff between fiscal and monetary credibility.25
3.2 The external public debt network in the interwar period
3.2.1 Buildup and collapse of the external sovereign debt network
The 1920s are often viewed as an earlier period of globalization. Studying the interwar period from the
public debt perspective can provide interesting insights into international financial linkages between private
and public agents. Existing research on this period mostly focused on overall external imbalances and the
role of monetary and exchange rate policies, thereby largely ignoring the role of sovereigns.
The role of sovereign debt in the intensifying financial network and its collapse in the early 1930s is
not to be neglected. Large foreign borrowing during wwi and the following reconstruction resulted in a
complex sovereign debt network (Figure 15). In 1928, continental European sovereigns owed 10 percent
24. The fragmentation of issuances likely contributed to deceiving market players about the true extent of public indebt-
edness and consequently obfuscated the pricing of sovereign risk.
25. See End (2019a) for an account of how Japan went from a regime of monetary dominance (with the objective to return
to the gold standard) to one of fiscal dominance and financial repression (led by militarism).
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Figure 14: Central bank exposure to government (percent of total public debt)
Note: This chart shows the distribution of ratios of central bank claims on the government to public debt in 1913, 1920,
and 1938. The crosses represent mean average values.
of U.S. gdp to the U.S. government and 27 percent of U.K. gdp to the U.K. government (De Broeck
et al. 2018). By 1933, most of this debt had been written off from governments’ balance sheets. In addition
to initial large intergovernmental debt flows, the period between wwi and wwii saw sharp movements in
private external financing of sovereigns. The stage of the interwar finance drama was set with constant
renegotiations of the reparation payments from defeated (mainly Germany) to Allied countries. Figure 16
sketches the timeline of negotiations, and Figure 17 illustrates how the network evolved over time. The
rest of this section examines these evolution in a systematic way.
This interconnectedness brought benefits such as improved financial intermediation and broader access
to finance. But the network was vulnerable in many ways and created risks. Shocks in one part of the
network could now be amplified and transmitted through common linkages, thus heightening the potential
for systemic risk.
The idd allows us to describe the external sovereign debt network in a systematic way. Formally,
the external debt network is a dynamic, directed graph whose nodes are countries and whose directed
edges are the outstanding public debts owed to each other.26 Drawing on graph theory and topology
metrics, we analyze the evolution over time of some graph metrics. Specifically, we examine the role
played by some countries and bilateral financial bonds in the overall network, and the transformation
of that network during the successive rounds of international negotiations and the advent of the Great
26. Either on each instrument as in Figure 15 or in aggregate terms as in Figure 17. The Young loans are not part of the
network, as it was mostly subscribed by domestic investors.
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Figure 15: The sovereign debt network at the instrument level, in 1928
Notes: Each edge is a foreign debt instrument. The picture is dominated by the links between Commonwealth countries,
indicated with purple diamonds.
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Figure 16: The evolution of financial interconnectedness during the interwar Period
wwi U.S. government financial links with Europe intensified
Prior to this point, main worldwide lenders were UK and France
During the war, U.S. lent more than us$ 10bn to the Allies through
Liberty Loans Acts
After the war, U.S. continuously rejected calls to cancel these debts,
but gradually accepted to renegotiate
Treaty of Versailles Conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference and estab-
lishment of the Reparation Commission
Allies demanded that Germany compensated war costs and damages
Reparation Commission determined the amount and nature of repa-
ration and schedule payments in Spring 1921
As soon as December 1921, Germany requested a partial postpone-
ment of the scheduled payments. Germany found it increasingly dif-
ficult to make the payments, repeatedly activating its escape clause
and eventually defaulting in January 1923 (thus triggering France
and Belgium’s invasion of the Ruhr)
U.S. endorsed only partially the treaty and requested amendments,
particularly on the issue of collective security and the League of Na-
tions (which the U.S. never joined)
Dawes Plan Formalization of interconnectedness, including war debt and
reparation payments, proposed by Reparation Commission
Lower annual reparation payments by Germany (become higher as
economy recovers), although the total amount was not determined
Germany’s economic policy was to be supervised by foreign powers,
and new currency adopted
U.S. (mainly) banks lent to German government to help economic
recovery; Germany started reparation payments to the European Al-
lies, who in turn repaid their war debts to the U.S.
Kellogg-Briand Pact International agreement to renounce war as an in-
strument of national policy
Originally signed by Germany, France and the U.S. in 1928; most
other nations followed (including the historically belligerent Japan)
Limited prospects to enforce debt contracts through military inva-
sion
Bilateral negotiations on debt rescheduling Buildup of the web between
war, reconstruction, and reparation debts
Under pressure to repay its significant debt to the US, the UK for-
mally addressed its European debtors with the Balfour note, point-
ing out that U.K. cannot really be expected to meet its obligations
to the U.S. without some international settlement that would ad-
dress Ally obligations to the U.K. and German reparation payments
(i.e. an attempt to link reparations to inter-allied war debt); U.S.
rejected this proposal and formed its World War Foreign Debt Com-
mission in 1922, to negotiate repayment plans with debtor countries
(on concessional terms)
France and Italy used the same strategy of conditioning its debt
service to German payments
Young Plan Reviewing German reparations once more
Some of the earlier terms were revised, most notably the total
amount of reparations was reduced
Another loan would be floated on the foreign markets (the “Young
Bond”)
The Young Plan also established the Bank for International Settle-
ments, tasked with facilitating payment of reparations in lieu of the
ad hoc Reparation Commission
Wall Street Crash Beginning of a breakdown in the financial system
U.S. banks had to recall flows to Europe; German and Austrian
banks failed
Hoover moratorium issued in 1931, suspending reparation payments
for one year
Lausanne Conference New attempt to extract reparations from Germany
Total amount of reparations reduced even further; interallied debt
implicitly repudiated
Agreement rejected by U.S. congress, but Germany nevertheless sus-
pended all payments shortly thereafter (Hitler elected in early 1933)
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Figure 17: The evolution of the external public debt network at the aggregate level
(a) 1917 (b) 1924
(c) 1930 (d) 1938
Note:
Contrary to Figure 15, edges here represent the aggregate bilateral debts, with the width of each edge being proportional to
its gold equivalent amount.
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Depression. Appendix H provides a graph theory background and the formal definitions of the graph
concepts used in this section.
First, we look at the topology of the network. As shown on Figure 18a, the cross-country sovereign
debt network was enlarged tremendously in 1924, probably as a consequence of the Dawes plan, which
restored confidence in the system while adding a new layer of loans to existing liabilities. We find also
new evidence that the Great Depression was precipitated by the cross-country public debt network: the
number of elementary circuits, that is the number of debtor-creditor paths that involved distinct countries
and formed a cycle, spiked dramatically in 1931.
Figure 18: Intensity of connections in the network
(a) Number of participants and connections (b) Average degrees
Note: Nodes are countries involved in the network, edges are their debt links, circuits are circular debt dependencies.
inDegree is the number of countries a country is borrowing from; outDegree is the number of countries a country is lending
to; and inDegreeW and outDegreeW are respectively the amount borrowed and lent by each country.
To measure the extent to which the number of connections increased in the network, we compute
several statistics. The degree of a node is the number of nodes in direct connection and can be interpreted
as the number of countries that directly depended on a given country. The in-degree is the number of
incoming connections to a country (the number of countries lending to it), while the out-degree is the
number of countries borrowing from a country. The degree can also be weighted by the size of each
connection—i.e., by the amount of outstanding debt. Figure 18b plots the evolution of the average degree
metrics over time. It confirms that the network became more intricate in the mid-1920s. Unsurprisingly,
we observe that the network collapsed in terms of volumes in the wake of the Great Depression, with total
external sovereign debt in the network dropping by approximately two thirds and returning to pre-wwi
levels. However, there were always some satellite countries that were not connected to all others—in graph
theory terms, the network was never strongly connected.
25
Figure 19: Country connectedness
(a) Importance of countries as borrowers (weighted in-
degree)
(b) Importance of countries as lenders (weighted out-
degree)
(c) Centrality as borrower (in-degree centrality) (d) Centrality as lender (out-degree centrality)
Note: On these charts as well as those that follow, the light blue shaded areas represent the range of results for the entire
sample, and the dark blue ones the central half of the distribution (from the 25th to the 75th percentile).
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Second, we investigate what countries dominated the network, either as a source or as a recipient of
funds in the form of sovereign debt. Figures 19a–19b show that the network was dominated (until the
early 1930s) by:
Germany, France, and the U.K. as sovereign borrowers. External debt in these countries was mostly
related to war financing and subsequent reconstruction.
The U.S. and the U.K., and to a smaller extent France, as the main lenders to other sovereigns.
This reflects both the dominance of London and New York as international financial centers as
well as the financing provided to their allies during the war. Contrary to the recent literature on
international currencies (Chiţu, Eichengreen, and Mehl 2014; Eichengreen and Flandreau 2009), we
find no clear evidence that the United States dominated the external sovereign debt market since
wwi. Instead, our analysis suggests the United Kingdom maintained its prominent role, regularly
outpacing the United States during the interwar period. This finding thus goes along with the
conventional historical narrative (Triffin 1960).
Degree centralityy—the unweighted in/out-degree normalized by the number of possible connections—
is another informative measure of connectedness as it quantifies how many countries were exposed to a given
sovereign’s default or to a sudden stop from a given country. On the one hand, there was no clear universal
borrower; most countries had a constant in-degree centrality, apart from Russia’s sudden appearance in
the first half of the 1930s and the high number of creditor countries to Germany, Austria, and post-wwi
France (Figure 19c). On the other hand, the out-degree centrality exhibits the same outsiders as the
weighted out-degree: United Kingdom, United States, and France (Figure 19d). Notably, while in terms
of amounts the United Kingdom and United States were roughly on equal footing; the United Kingdom
financed more countries than the United States, in part owing to its close ties within the Commonwealth.
Next, we turn to the importance of a country, as debtor or creditor, for the overall system. The
overall systemicity and exposure of a country can be proxied by its closeness to other nodes in the
network, which is larger when a country can reach other countries in the network in fewer steps.27 While
the average exposure (in-closeness) built up during wwi and in the runup to the Great Depression, the
average weighted systemicity remained low (Figure 20a). Such an asymmetry between a high number of
borrowers and a small and central number of lenders likely contributed to propagate the shock in the early
1930s. Surprisingly, the U.K., the United States, and France were not only the main lenders (and thereby
closely exposed to the network), but they were also close in the sense that their default would have quickly
impacted most countries in the network (Figure 20b).
So far, we have only looked at countries that could generate or receive a shock. Next, we investigate the
importance of a country as a vector of contagion, that is its betweenness. Betweenness can be understood as
27. Closeness can also be computed by replacing the number of steps to reach other nodes with a measure of distance
between nodes, namely the inverse of the outstanding debt tying countries together.
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Figure 20: Closeness
(a) Average (b) Systemicity by country (out-closeness)
Note: inClose and outClose are the in-closeness and out-closeness measures, our proxies for exposure and systemicity,
respectiviely. inCloseD and outCloseD are their weighted equivalents.
the number of direct connections between two countries that transit through a give country.28 Figure 21a
shows how betweenness increased with wwi and decreased only with mounting isolationism in the mid-
1930s. Figure 21b sheds light on the role of specific countries, as it reveals that Argentina in the 1920s
and Russia in the 1930s were possible financial stress conduits, along with France and the U.K.. This is
yet another result that narrative evidence had so far overlooked.
The last systemic weakness we investigate is the extent of clustering, which is indicative of circularities
in the financial dependencies among countries. Such circularities can potentially transmit and amplify
shocks in the overall financial system and complicate the workout of defaults or stress episodes. To measure
this, we rely on a clustering coefficient that can be understood as the probability that two neighbors of
a node are neighbors themselves. On Figures 21c, we observe the high values obtained by Australia and
Italy. These countries, even though not outstanding in terms of external public debt or credit to other
sovereigns, found themselves in the middle of intricate networks.29
We can also measure to what extent the network was vulnerable to a few nodes using the central
point of dominance statistics. As can be seen from Figure 21d, the Dawes plan was successful in that it
broadened the network to more players (simultaneously diffusing the risks). After the Great Depression
hit, the network became once again much more centralized, with a small number of countries upon which
the entire system became dependent.
28. It can also be weighted by the debt oustanding.
29. Incidentally, the maximum k-core of the network, that is the list of countries with maximal degree, happens to be quite
stable and contains not only France, Germany, the U.K., and the United States, but also Argentina, Belgium, Italy, and for
some years the U.S.S.R..
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Figure 21: Betweenness and clustering
(a) Average betweenness and clustering (b) Importance as contagion vector (weighted between-
ness)
(c) Circularity of the network (weighted clustering) (d) Vulnerability to a central country (central point of
dominance)
Note: between is the betweenness measure, our proxy for the role of countries in propagating default risks through the
network; clust, for clustering, is our measure of circular dependencies in the system; betweenW and clustW are the
weighted equivalents.
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In conclusion, graph theory shows how the network was vulnerable to the dominance of a small number
of influential actors, while the actual exposure of each country was blurred by an intricate network. We
thus confirm that the extent of interconnectedness was greater than what one would infer from net positions
alone (Figure 17). In addition, various manifestations of interconnectedness fed into each other, rendering
the global financial system vulnerable to sovereign stress (De Broeck et al. 2018).
Figure 22: The sovereign debt network in 1931
(a) Borrowers (b) Lenders (c) Net position
Source: De Broeck et al. (2018).
Note: The width of each link represents the amount of outstanding debt, while the size of the nodes represent the
outstanding stock of debt borrowed by sovereigns on chart 22a, lent to sovereigns on chart 22b, and in net terms on
chart 22c (based on amounts converted in US dollars, with the same scaling parameter for all charts).
3.2.2 Inherent institutional weaknesses
How could such a network develop in the first place? While it is mostly a legacy of wwi (war financing
and reparations) and the need to rapidly finance a joint fight against common enemies, some institutional
deficiencies certainly vulnerabilities.
First, the interwar period was characterized by lack of cooperation and gaps in the mandate and mem-
bership of such new international organizations as the League of Nations and the Bank of International
Settlements. Forceful economic and political events, including the Great Depression and eventual aban-
donment of the gold standard, contributed to an atmosphere of growing international isolationism in the
1930s and led eventually to wwii. There was a clear coordination problem, as epitomized by the failure
of the Reparations Committees.
Second, there was a conflict of interest for countries who held debt from two countries that were also in
a debtor-creditor situation. There was for instance a US vested interest in maintaining the status quo, for
their private bankers were refinancing some of the largest sovereign liabilities in Europe (Chernow 2010).
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Third, although the lon contributed somewhat to the exchange of information, they failed short of
auditing the data. Absent a fiscal watchdog and transparency standards, countries could thus easily make
up their balance sheets. We have already mentioned the issue of the unit of account for foreign bonds.
Belgian debt was reported in issuing currency, while Canada and Australia reported everything in gb£
(including bonds issued in us$). Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, India,
Japan all resorted to a mix of legal and contractual parities, instead of market rates. None of these
conventions seems fit in a world where only gold equivalents mattered.
The reasons underpinning what can appear ex post as misreporting are unclear. Was it a deliberate ob-
fuscation about the true extent of sovereign indebtedness? Or were these accounting choices a consequence
of some more subtle political motives? For instance, France kept using pre-wwi gold standard parity until
1928, while market quoted the franc as low as one-fifth its prewar value (De Broeck et al. 2018). Yet, it
is unclear whether French governments meant to hide to 80 percent of their external debt or whether the
goal was to provide assurance that the gold parity would be somehow restored—which, before Minister
Poincaré’s 1926 policies, was the official baseline.
Consequence of the asymmetry of information between governments and bondholders about the actual
amount of public debt, sovereign bonds were probably ill-priced, and sovereign risk underestimated. Not
unlike today, there seemed to be a disconnect between sovereign spreads and fundamentals—meaning: the
level of debt, fiscal discipline, growth prospects, international liquidity—that the geopolitical background
alone cannot explain.
Anecdotal evidence shows also that rating agencies failed to anticipate sovereign crises: Table 23 for
instance highlights how on the brink of a default, some Commonwealth Dominions were still rated as
safe while arguably stronger European countries had some bonds rated as having significant credit risks
(Dabla-Norris et al. 2019).
4 Conclusion
This paper describes a new, instrument-level database of sovereign debt for 18 countries over the period
1913-46. The interwar debt database contains data on amounts outstanding for some 3,800 individual
debt instruments as well as the associated qualitative information, including instrument type, coupon rate,
maturity, and currency of issue. We believe that this is the most comprehensive and comparable data to
conduct research on public finances during the turbulent interwar period. The information contained in
the database can provide unique insights into macroeconomic and sovereign debt policies implemented in
the interwar period. We show for instance how interwar governments rolled over debts that were largely
unsustainable. The database also sheds new light on public debt management policies.
31
Figure 23: Ratings of bonds issued in London
Source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2019).
We document how the external public debt network contributed to the collapse of the international
financial system in the early 1930s. The graph analysis conducted in this paper highlights the inherent
vulnerabilities of debt networks. The dominant or exposed positions of some influential players and the
circularity of some financial dependencies posed risks. These risks were underestimated because of the
intricacy of the network. Incidentally, such an analysis is not possible for today’s network, which is most
likely even more intricate, because data on bond ownership is fragmentary. Our findings call for data
transparency in that regard. It would be desirable to compile data on locational public debt (in the
similar vein as the locational banking data that the bis compiles).
We believe the idd ’s rich quantitative and descriptive content will find different users. Historians
might find it useful to quantify their narratives, in particular about war financing. Potential links with
broader policies—agricultural, social, financial—and the development of providence states are multiple.
Economists should also be able to draw interesting parallels with today’s economies, particularly since
numerous episodes of macro instability happened during the interwar period. Future work could also
extend the database, compiling data to the other countries that reported to the League of Nations—
chiefly Latin American countries and smaller European countries— and collecting price data for marketable
government debt securities.30
30. Such extensions would also contribute to digitize rare information contained in publications that have long been out of
print.
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Appendices
A Sources
When wwi ended, the economic and financial conditions in Europe were in dire straits. The newly-
founded League of Nations (lon) organized a large economic conference in Brussels in Fall 1920 and
later established the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service, including several Committees
(Nichols 1942). The Statistical Committee was designed to collect and publish economic and financial
statistics. It progressively steered statistical cooperation between member countries, leading to the 1929
International Convention on Economic Statistics that imposed on ratifying countries to publish certain
classes of economic statistics according to common principles.
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Figure 24: Examples of lon data
(a) Public debt, Austria (b) Central bank balance sheet, France
Sources: lon (1926), lon (1937).
The idd draws mostly from the League’s Public Finance and Public Debt publications (Figure 24).31
These publications compile information on public finances of 61 countries over the 1913–1947 period. To
the best of our knowledge, few physical copies of the League publications are still available today and
we are the first ones to digitize the information they contain on public debt instruments.32 We also used
the Money and Banking and Statistical Yearbook to infer credit lines and advances offered by central
banks to governments, as well as exchange rates.33 Although the League of Nations publications contain
surprisingly detailed information, they were only sporadic, resulting in data gaps. Plus, coverage was not
equally comprehensive for each country.
Our second systematic source of information was John Moody’s publications for Mergent Inc. (Figure
25).34 In 1918, the corporation started publishing an annual series of manuals describing foreign and
American government securities. From this source, we mainly extract the characteristics of sovereign
debt instruments (typically, the date, location, and rate of interest payments, maturity year, redemption
rules, taxation regime, and marketplaces). But their reporting was not watertight. In some instances,
instruments were sometimes forgotten, or outstanding amounts were not correctly updated. Some other
instruments were listed before their actual issuance—and sometimes they eventually failed to be issued.
Therefore, as a rule, we use Moody’s outstanding amounts only in cases where no other source was
available or in conjunction with aggregates provided in other sources. Moody’s also attributed a rating
31. lon (1923b, 1927, 1929, 1936b, 1948)
32. Chiţu, Eichengreen, and Mehl (2014) compile an interwar database on global foreign debt using the lon sources.
However, this information is aggregated and does not include instrument-level information for both domestic and foreign
public debt.
33. lon (1931b, 1935, 1936a, 1945)
34. Moody (Yearly issues)
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Figure 25: Examples of Moody’s publications
(a) Cover page (b) Summary table of traded bonds
Sources: Moody’s (1918).
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to each security; however, the narrative analysis provided in De Broeck et al. (2018) suggests that these
ratings proved ex post not to be a good proxy for the underlying risk of default. For instance, they failed
to anticipate the early 1930s sudden stop on external borrowing that followed the Great Depression.
Figure 26: A snapshot of information from national sources
Source: Finance Accounts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for the Financial Year 1921-22, ended 31st
March 1922.
Apart from the League of Nations’ and Moody’s publications, other sources of information useful in the
compilation of the idd generally fell into three main categories: (1) national sources,35 (2) literature and
commentaries (often contemporary),36 (3) international treaties and conventions (for example, the Dawes
and Young Plans).37 National sources used include Statistical Yearbooks, Government Manuals, Central
Bank Bulletins, and other statistics compilations (Figure 26). Detail by country is listed in Table 1. The
idd documents clearly the source underpinning each number.
Table 1: Additional sources used to compile the idd, by country
Country National sources References
Argentina Memoría de la Contaduria de la Nación (1913–1926)
Memoría del Departamento de Hacienda (1913–1926)
Revista de Economía Argentina (1918–1922)
Australia Year Book Australia: Section 19—Commonwealth Finance (1913–1927)
Belgium Annuaire statistique de la Belgique et du Congo belge (1913–1922)
Canada Public Accounts (1914–1927)
Chile Anuario Estadistico—Hacienda (1913–1922)
Chilean Public Finance (1932)
Costa Rica Memoria de la Secretaria de Hacienda y Comercio (1913-1922)
France Annuaire Statistique by Insee
Archives of the French mof (CAEF)
Compte général de l’administration des finances by mof
Fisk (1922); Huet (1935);
Laufenburger and Baudhuin
(1947); French mof (1946); Na-
tional Shawmut Bank (1915);
Sauvy (1965); Teillard (1921)
35. including, at times, physical bonds and archived advertisement billboards
36. This included speeches or articles delivered by contemporary economists, finance ministers, central bankers, or jour-
nalists. Private bankers, who played the role of governments’ advisers (“money doctors”), underwriters, and investors’
representatives, also had at times interesting insights on public debt.
37. Reparation Commission (1922–30), Young Committee (1930), and The Hague Agreement (1930).
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Table 1: Additional sources (continued)
Country National sources References
Germany Reichstagsprotokolle (1913–1924)
The Hague Agreement (1930)
Reichsanzeiger
Lotz (1927); Will (1921)
India Combined finance and revenue accounts of the central and provincial
governments in India (1913–1922)
Accounts and Estimates (1923)
Dubey (1930)
Italy Banca d’Italia Annual Reports (1923–1938)
Japan Financial and Economic Annual of Japan by the Okurasho¯
A Financial History of Sho¯wa [Sho¯wa Zaisei Shi] (To¯kyo¯: To¯yo¯ Keizai),
20 volumes
boj (1962); boj (1966)
Metzler (2006); Tomita (2005);
Fujino and Teranishi (2000);
Mitzakis (1939)
New
Zealand
Statistical Year Book (1913–1926)
Public Accounts (1913–1946)
Russia Statistical Year Book of the Russian Empire (1913–1915)
Statistical Year Book of the Soviet Union (1922–1926, 1934–1945)
Statistical Book “State Budget vol. I (1918–1937) and vol. II (1938–
1950)”
rsae (Various issues)
Notes on the Execution of the Budget (1934–1937), by mof
Dyachenko (1978)
South Africa Official year book of the Union (1916–1921)
U.K. Bank of England, A millennium of Macroeconomic Data for the U.K. Pember and Boyle (1950);
Wormell (2002)
U.S. Monthly Treasury reports (1913–1946)
B Methodological notes
B.1 General assumptions
Sources described in Appendix A contributed to the bulk of the information contained in the idd, but
there were some remaining gaps. Although these could potentially be filled with other sources that require
more extensive efforts to obtain and process, the idd relies on several inference methods. Besides, to
make the information in the idd comparable across countries, we also applied fiscal-to-calendar year and
currency conversions.
Bond life cycle A typical debt instrument has an outstanding amount that can only decline over time,
going to zero after the maturing date. This property is respected in the idd, except for the following
categories: 1. credit lines and advances, whose amounts could fluctuate over time; 2. bonds issued in
foreign currency, in which case the amount in issuing currency would respect the declining property
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over time; 3. rolling short-term bonds that were quasi-automatically reissued and that were hard to
disaggregate into separate issuances.
Linear interpolation Interpolation made sense in some cases—for example, gaps between two points
with the same amounts outstanding, or between two points with declining values.
Disaggregation In some instances, various bond issuances were aggregated into one broad category (for
example, Treasury bills, whose coupon rate changed at each issuance). We denote such bonds in the
database as Rolling issuance dates and Floating coupon rate. As far as possible, we tried to break
these categories down into separate issuances, particularly for categories constituting a sizable portion of
public debt. To do so, we relied on Moody’s publications which reported amounts outstanding for each
issuance and applied the breakdown to the aggregates reported in the League of Nations publications.
Fiscal to calendar year conversions Fiscal years differed for the sample of 18 countries included in
the idd, and in some cases fiscal years changed over the interwar period (Table 2). All the series in
the idd were converted to calendar years (ending December 31), thus reflecting the end-of-year amounts
outstanding for all instruments. That allows us to apply December exchange rates to the underlying
series and obtain the amount of debt in any available currency.
Currency conversions The League of Nations reported amounts outstanding in domestic currency, even
for instruments that were issued in foreign currencies and/or on foreign markets. Country-specific meth-
ods of debt conversion used by the League of Nations undermine the comparability of debt series across
countries. When compiling idd data, we first expressed outstanding debt amounts in currencies of is-
sue, then performed interpolation and end-of-period harmonization. The resulting series were finally
converted to nominal U.S. dollars, a common currency. However, accounting for the fact that the U.S.
dollar was unpegged from gold in 1934 and consequently depreciated, we introduced another proxy for
the universal currency—gold. For currency conversions we used the exchange rates published by the
Federal Reserve (Fed (1943) and lon (Various issues) and Figure 27).
B.2 Country-specific issues
Argentina Several instruments reported by the government and included in the domestic component of
the public debt possess all features of foreign obligations. Three instruments called Credito Argentino
Interno were included in the internal debt section, while they were issued on European markets with
the option of for both principal and interest payments to be made abroad. Even though some of these
bonds were also issued domestically, we assume that these instruments were foreign in their full amount.
Besides, the League of Nations reported Argentinian debt under “legal parity” and “contractual exchange
rates.” We relied on information on amounts of debt issued in the original currency to back out amounts
by instruments in a common convertible currency.
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Figure 27: The evolution of various exchange rates during the interbellum period
Sources: Fed (1943), C. M. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), authors’ calculations.
Note: End-of-period exchange rates, national currency per U.S. dollar. These are comparable to the exchange rates provided
as of end of fiscal year published in the League of Nations publications. If no data is available for the end-of-period, fiscal
year exchange rates are used instead. Shaded areas indicate years in which a country adheres to the gold or gold exchange
standards.
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Table 2: Fiscal years of countries included in the lon publications
44
Australia (1) Australia issued substantial amount of war loans that only are vaguely described in the
League of Nations’ books, while representing a substantial chunk of debt. We used the amount of
loans issued and aggregates reported by Moody’s and assumed the shares of each instrument to be
constant.
(2) The Commonwealth of Australia agreed to take over the foreign debt issued by the States in 1928.
The League of Nation did not report debt of the States up until this year, while they represented a
sizable portion of the overall Australian financial obligations. We retropolated individual State debt
instruments by using Moody’s articles covering the Australian States as well as the State Finance
section of Australian Yearbooks.
(3) Most instruments summarized in the League of Nations tables do not have issuance date, only the
maturity date, which complicated the interpolation process.
Austria Changing country borders led to complex arrangements for the settlement of the pre-Austria
imperial debt and of the relief loans received after the first World War.
Chile The League reported foreign debt, which was entitled in various currencies, after converting to
domestic currency under the assumption of the fixed exchange rate, because the spot exchange rate fluc-
tuated considerably. By contrast, we applied flexible end-of-year exchange rates, so that our aggregates
are substantially different from that of the League.
France A number of complementary sources were used.
(1) Both League of Nations and national sources relied on a changing public debt perimeter—in par-
ticular, some debts were issued or bought by public banks and corporations, and the government
at times assumed the debt service of public companies (such as railways), guaranteed local and
colonial governments, and built financial liabilities in the form of annuities rather than public debt.
We included any instrument that seemed to ultimately be a central government liability.
(2) In the 1920s, the French realized they could not service their debt towards allies and investors in
allied countries if Germany did not honor its war reparation obligations. Consequently, the French
stopped reporting their foreign liabilities transparently. In 1924, they stopped reporting foreign
debts in actual francs and referred only to the gold franc value—thereby underestimating them
roughly fivefold. As international negotiations to solve the war debt issue stalled, national statistics
stopped reporting these debts altogether.
(3) Most of the WWI and WWII accounting occurred ex post and is complicated by changing borders
and the German occupation. It is especially difficult to gauge (a) the implicit debt imposed by the
Reich onto the Vichy government through the occupation levy, (b) the money borrowed in 1945
from the U.S..38
38. Which was ultimately washed down by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties and devaluations.
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Germany Estimation of German reparation stock required us to refer to original agreements, since the
League of Nations books do not provide such information. We split the period from 1924 to 1936 into
three subperiods.
(1) According to the Dawes plan introduced in 1924, Germany was obliged to pay 1bn RM in 1925,
1.22bn RM in 1926, 1.5bn RM in 1927, 1.75bn RM and starting from 1929 2.5bn RM annually over
the period of 45 years. The volume of reparations using the Dawes plan annuities is 41.6 bn RM in
1924 prices, which is consistent with Ritschl (2012)’s estimation.
(2) The German economy was incapable of servicing the reparations which resulted in several rounds of
renegotiation. In 1930, the Young plan lowered the annual reparation payments and spread them
over a period of 58 years. Using the annuities from the Young plan, we could identify the sharp
decrease in outstanding reparations from 46.9bn in 1929 to 37.5bn in 1930. the German tranches of
the Young Loan of 1930 were issued in British pounds, distributed among the domestic investors,
and thus recorded under domestic debt, while the League of Nations statisticians considered them
as part of foreign obligations. We decided to follow the residency criterion and classify these loans
as domestic.
(3) With the rise of the Nazi party in 1933, reparation payments were substantially reduced, followed by
an indefinite halt of payments in 1936. The reparation stock for the remaining period (1933-1936)
is calculated based on the actual transfers to the BIS from Germany.
Japan Japanese bonds are characterized not only by a maturity and coupon rate, but also by a mark or
a counter. Marks are letters in the hiragana alphabet (e.g., ro, tsu, ne)—they come from the ancient
way of enumerating in Japan. The League reports were widely incomplete and missed the differences
between all these instruments. Using national sources, we managed to disentangle aggregates and have
a fuller picture.
New Zealand For New Zealand, the League of Nations publications do not contain sufficient information
for disaggregation or interpolation. For example, debt instruments were reported without issuance dates.
Turning to national sources, we encountered some issues with the lack of information on whether a debt
instrument was issued locally or abroad. We therefore supplemented national sources with Moody’s
publications, matching instruments with their descriptions using the due date. Furthermore, instruments
were grouped differently across various vintages of national sources. In earlier vintages, the amounts were
grouped by authorization acts, while the same instrument could be divided across several different acts
in later vintages.
Russia/USSR The stock of debt contracted under the tsarist regime stopped being published in 1915
and the Soviets repudiated it formally in February 1918. To fill in the gaps between 1915 and 1918, we
used data on debt service to infer the evolution of the stock of imperial debt. For a couple of years after
repudiation, no debt was apparently issued, until the first bread loan in 1923. Detailed annual information
on outstanding external debt in the 1930s, which mostly took the form of mostly governmental loans, is
sparse. When unavailable, we assumed that the credit amount remained unchanged for the entire initially
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agreed period. Moreover, we exclude the liability created by the 1941 Lend-Lease agreement with the
U.S., absent a reliable valuation. Several attempts were made to assess the value of goods, equipment,
vehicles and food delivered by the U.S. during wwii, but the various estimates differ widely. Eventually,
after several decades of negotiation about the amount of goods received, Russia agreed to repay the U.S.
a small fraction of what was delivered and outlived the war.
C Taxonomy of debt instruments
Public debt in this database refers to debt contractually incurred by the central government of a country.
This definition excludes municipal and other sub-central government debts, as well as debt guaranteed by
the government (typically, securities issued by state-owned industries or banks).39 However, debt taken
over explicitly by the central government are part of our database starting on the date of debt assump-
tion. Hence, some instruments can appear in this database well after their issuance dates. The database
also includes non-marketable debt—obligations that specific agencies or individuals (e.g., a central bank
advance or a pension annuity) hold nominatively and cannot sell either over the counter or on a secondary
market.
Since domestic debt markets were not yet internationalized during the interwar period, instruments
were not harmonized across countries and time. Bond denominations did not follow any specific standards
and were not necessarily in line with today’s understanding. For instance, a sovereign “loan” was a security,
not a credit. Against this backdrop, liabilities in the idd were classified by the nature of promised cash
flows into the following instrument types:
Bond Debt instrument that obligated the government to two types of cash flow: (1) a principal when the
bonds were presented to the paying agent on or after their maturity date; (2) interest payments when
attached coupons were presented to the paying agent. During the interwar period, bullet bonds were
rare; most bond principals could be paid before the maturity date. In addition to principal, some
premiums or prizes could be given away by the government. They could be called loan or notes,
depending on national traditions. Some bonds, such as the British stocks, were inscribed or held at
a deed register; they could only be transferred through a deed, which was considered a more secure
method of transferring ownership of the claim. Inscription entailed a process of writing ownership
into the lenders’ books.
Perpetual A particularly popular type of bond in the beginning of the twentieth century were perpetuals.
These consols or rentes had no maturity date, which means that the principal was never paid—
39. The data for Australia include the information for the states from 1931 (the year of the Commonwealth Debt Conversion
Act, i.e. conversion of the internal public debts of the Commonwealth and the states). Newfoundland’s debt is included in
total debt for Canada from 1934.
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unless the government or the bondholder activated their potential options to redeem it. Formally,
the promised cash flow is an infinite series of interest payments.
Bill Debt instrument without coupons, generally with a shorter-term maturity than bonds. The interest
was implicitly or explicitly pre-counted, that is, deducted upfront, as a discount between the issue
price and the facial principal. This category includes numerous Treasury bills. Some of the bills,
generally very short-term ones, were implicitly rolled-over unless creditors objected.
Credit These instruments were generally contracted with financial institutions and provided annual pay-
ments of both some principal and interests. It came either as a one-off borrowing, or as lines of credit
on which governments could draw on demand (within pre-agreed ceiling). Another type of credit
that common during wars was trade credits agreed with the intercession of allied governments; for
instance, Morgan & Co. would provide trade credits to France for war supplies during wwi, with
the Commerce and Treasury Secretaries’ implicit approvals. By contrast with bonds and bills, where
multiple small-denomination contracts were signed with a myriad of lenders, credits were by nature
bilateral and more sizable. Consequently, they were probably more likely renegotiated on an ongoing
basis. The debt reported in the idd corresponds to the outstanding amount to be repaid
Advance These financing facilities were arranged with local bodies, other government departments (e.g.,
Treasury, central bank), savings banks, or foreign authorities. They generally involved a low or null
interest rate, an open-ended maturity, and were at best governed by by-laws rather than commercial
contracts. A peculiar sort of advance was tax bonds; taxpayers gave the government an advance on
future tax payments.
Account Demand or term deposits were sometimes made available to the government, either regulatorily
or voluntarily. Typically, the government compelled or enticed through moral suasion state-owned
enterprises (soes), colonial and subnational governments, to make their cash available to the gov-
ernment. This instrument is alike a credit line, but it is up to the account owner (e.g., soes) to
change the outstanding amounts.
Annuity Annual budget payments could be pledged, by law, as compensation for several reasons. For
instance, old-aged or war pensions were recorded as capitalized annuities. Such debt had no set
maturity date, and the government could amend its cash flow by law. It is different from a perpetual
in that the annual payment is not a contractual coupon rate, rather a lump-sum allocated in each
annual budget.
Other Some public debt instruments or aggregates for which no decomposition was possible fit in none of
the above categories. This particularly includes arrears, a less trackable form of debt were payment
delays, that were sometimes recorded as part of public debt. Arrears could be securitized—i.e.,
suppliers could be paid in sovereign securities instead of cash, what some authors describe as forced
loans. This category also encompasses debt transferred from provinces to central government, which
it is typically not trivial to decompose into individual instruments. Unidentified small portions of
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public debt without any characteristic reported in the official documents were added to this category
as well.
D Instrument characteristics
In addition to the amounts outstanding and the typology detailed in Appendix C, the idd includes a
variety of instrument characteristics. Below are detailed definitions for each characteristic. The idd also
contains more detailed information, upon availability.
Table 3: List of currencies
Currency Code Currency Code
Argentinean Paper Peso ARS Greek Drachma DRA
Australian Pound AUP Indian Rupee INR
Austrian Krone AUK Italian Lira ITL
Austrian Schilling ATS Japanese Yen JPY
Belgian Franc BEF New Zealand Pound NZP
British Pound GBP Norwegian Krone NOK
Canadian Dollar CAD Russian (gold/soviet) Rouble RUB
Chilean Peso CLP South African Pound SAP
Costa Rican Colon CRC Spanish Peseta PTA
Czechoslovak Koruna CZK Swedish Krone SEK
Dutch Guilder NLG Swiss Franc CHF
Egyptian Pound EGP Uruguayan Peso UYU
French Franc FRF United States Dollar USD
German Mark DEM Gold Gold
Issuer The country whose sovereign issued or guaranteed the instrument (i.e., 18 countries included in
the idd).
Instrument name Taken directly from the lon publications, national sources and/or the Moody’s docu-
ments. Instrument names typically contained information about the type of instrument, the coupon
rate, and either issuance date or maturity. Instrument names were also useful for tracking different
instruments across various sources used to compile the database.
Entity The entity issuing the instrument. In the database, this column contains the following values:
bank, cb (central bank), cg (central government), lg (local government), and soes.
Residency and Currency The market on which the instrument was issued and the currency of issue (see
Table 3 for the various currencies in the database). This can be any one of the values under “Issuer”,
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or a combination of the values for bonds that were issued on multiple markets. For instruments issued
in multiple currencies, we were generally able to break down exactly between each—but sometimes
we relied on equal share assumptions. Foreign debt refers primarily to residency, which we define
somewhat subjectively. Since there is no information about the ownership of individual bonds, we
classify a security as foreign when it was intended for foreign investors—typically, when it was issued
mainly on foreign stock exchanges, in foreign currency, or with exchange rate guarantees (e.g., a
‘gold clause’). Sometimes, the same instrument was issued in several countries. Whenever possible,
we tried to break the instrument down between the various countries of issuance.
Transferability Refers to whether (or not) the debt was transferable through secondary markets. The
dataset includes the following values: Y (transferable), N (non-transferable), NA (no information
available) and T(for inscribed stocks).
Coupon rate Interest rate associated with the instrument (expressed in percent). Coupon rate is gen-
erally the easiest characteristics to report. This is the nominal interest payment that was promised
upon issuance, given on a yearly basis (interest payments were generally semi-annual or quarterly).40
Therefore, it does not include the various premia that were often granted upon issuance or redemp-
tion. If interest rates were pre-counted (i.e., paid upfront at issuance), then we assume the coupon
rate was nil. If interest rates were readjusted regularly, in the case of either short-term bills that
were automatically or regularly reissued or formal indexation to a reference rate (which were quite
rare), then we would classify them as floating.
Interest payable Months in which interest was paid to the instrument bearer. This information is always
mainly for tradable bonds.
Issuance Date on, or year during which the instrument was issued. For the few instruments that were
issued on tap, this would be the time of first issuance.
Maturing date Ultimate redemption date for the principal. When the instruments were semi-automat-
ically rolled over, this is coded as rolling.
Maturity Difference between “Maturing date” and “First issuance”. Items where no information was pro-
vided on maturity were classified based on the instrument type, i.e. bills, credit, notes, advances and
allied bonds and miscellaneous borrowings considered as short-term obligations, while loans, bonds,
stocks, and annuities as long-term. Perpetual bonds, which were quite common until wwii, are clas-
sified as long-term bonds, even though they technically never pay any principal back. Implicitly, the
maturity can be found as the date at which interest payments total the initially borrowed amount
P . For an annualized coupon rate c, the implicit maturity is: τ = 1/c. For a 5-percent perpetual, for
instance, this is 20 years. Alternatively, the duration would be a function of bondholders’ average
life expectancy.
40. Technically, coupons were pieces of paper attached to bonds, which holders had to exchange at given dates for cash at
the Treasury. Hence, it is used as shorthand for the nominal rate of interest on a security (Wormell 2002).
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Redemption Some debt instruments had embedded options that let either the government or the lender
trigger principal repayment earlier than the maturity date. Government’s early redemption could
involve lotteries or randomization, as well as largess when computing the current latent value of the
bond. Possible values are Y, N, and NA, with additional details in the adjacent column—who could
call the redemption option (Holder, Issuer, Issuer/Holder) and how redemption was organized
(Lottery or SF for sinking fund).
Start Redemption Usually, governments kept the option the redeem their bonds to benefit from im-
proving market conditions; however, this type of redeemability would often start a few years after
issuance (thereby respecting some sort of grace period) and involve a randomization (or lottery) to
decide which bonds would be redeemed first.
Grace period Difference between “Start redemption” and “First issuance”.
Sinking Fund These were cash reserves established to assist in the redemption of public loans on ma-
turity. Portions of budget revenues were sometimes devoted to these funds. Permanent or funded
debt was usually debt for which a sinking (redemption) fund had the liability to pay the interest.
Possible values are Y, N, and NA.
Tax Taxability is an important characteristic of debt management, although often overlooked by the
literature. Tax incentives to hold sovereign debt were common and changed the effective return on
such an investment. Tax exemptions could be granted for interest gains under the income tax, for
capital gains related to holding sovereign bonds, or more generally for all taxes. Blanket exemptions
were almost always granted to foreign bondholders. Possible values are Y, N, and NA.
Purpose A broad categorization of the purposes for which instruments were issued. Indeed, it was
common at the time that Parliament had to approve each issuance, and that was generally done
within the context of a legal instrument that implemented specific policies. In addition, it was part
of the advertisement of the bond placement to familiarize the buyer what they were contributing to
finance (e.g., war or liberty). Possible values are: Conversion, Defense, Economic development,
Infrastructure, Miscellaneous, and NA.
Miscellaneous information Complementary information is added on an ad hoc basis. For instance,
the rare cases of bond indexation, details on taxation regimes, or the debt’s official purpose are
recorded, whenever it was possible. More detail on any of the other columns is also provided here.
For Japan, we document the mark given to each series of securities—a Japanese character used in
Imperial Japan to enumerate things. For Argentina and Chile, we add law or decree number that
authorized the issue if available.
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E Central bank balance sheet data
To gauge the central bank’s exposure to the sovereign—in other words, the extent of monetary financing
and fiscal dominance—, we also compile itemized balance sheet data for the central banks of the countries
in our dataset.
The main source for this is the League of Nations publications on Money and Banking.41 Since these
publications were sporadic, we cannot cover the entire 1913–46 period and generally miss 1914–17, 1926–
28, and the outer years of wwii. In addition, the League of Nations changed its standardized balance
sheet classification after the Great Depression. In the idd, we document clearly how we approximate the
post-Great Depression classification into that prevailing before 1929. For instance, we assume implicitly
that collateral involved in repo transactions or discounted by central banks had to be mostly constituted
of sovereign or quasi-sovereign papers. Similarly, we recorded deposits under other deposits by default,
unless it was obvious that it was a current account.
41. lon (1922a, 1923a, 1924a, 1924b, 1926, 1931a, 1934, 1935, 1936a).
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F Chronology of international loans
Financial interconnectedness evolved as follows during the interwar period:
wwi U.S. government financial links with Europe intensified
Prior to this point, main worldwide lenders were UK and France
During the war, U.S. lent more than us$ 10bn to the Allies through
Liberty Loans Acts
After the war, U.S. continuously rejected calls to cancel these debts,
but gradually accepted to renegotiate
Treaty of Versailles Conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference and estab-
lishment of the Reparation Commission
Allies demanded that Germany compensated war costs and damages
Reparation Commission determined the amount and nature of repa-
ration and schedule payments in Spring 1921
As soon as December 1921, Germany requested a partial postpone-
ment of the scheduled payments. Germany found it increasingly dif-
ficult to make the payments, repeatedly activating its escape clause
and eventually defaulting in January 1923 (thus triggering France
and Belgium’s invasion of the Ruhr)
U.S. endorsed only partially the treaty and requested amendments,
particularly on the issue of collective security and the League of Na-
tions (which the U.S. never joined)
Dawes Plan Formalization of interconnectedness, including war debt and
reparation payments, proposed by Reparation Commission
Lower annual reparation payments by Germany (become higher as
economy recovers), although the total amount was not determined
Germany’s economic policy was to be supervised by foreign powers,
and new currency adopted
U.S. (mainly) banks lent to German government to help economic
recovery; Germany started reparation payments to the European Al-
lies, who in turn repaid their war debts to the U.S.
Kellogg-Briand Pact International agreement to renounce war as an in-
strument of national policy
Originally signed by Germany, France and the U.S. in 1928; most
other nations followed (including the historically belligerent Japan)
Limited prospects to enforce debt contracts through military inva-
sion
Bilateral negotiations on debt rescheduling Buildup of the web between
war, reconstruction, and reparation debts
Under pressure to repay its significant debt to the US, the UK for-
mally addressed its European debtors with the Balfour note, point-
ing out that U.K. cannot really be expected to meet its obligations
to the U.S. without some international settlement that would ad-
dress Ally obligations to the U.K. and German reparation payments
(i.e. an attempt to link reparations to inter-allied war debt); U.S.
rejected this proposal and formed its World War Foreign Debt Com-
mission in 1922, to negotiate repayment plans with debtor countries
(on concessional terms)
France and Italy used the same strategy of conditioning its debt
service to German payments
Young Plan Reviewing German reparations once more
Some of the earlier terms were revised, most notably the total
amount of reparations was reduced
Another loan would be floated on the foreign markets (the “Young
Bond”)
The Young Plan also established the Bank for International Settle-
ments, tasked with facilitating payment of reparations in lieu of the
ad hoc Reparation Commission
Wall Street Crash Beginning of a breakdown in the financial system
U.S. banks had to recall flows to Europe; German and Austrian
banks failed
Hoover moratorium issued in 1931, suspending reparation payments
for one year
Lausanne Conference New attempt to extract reparations from Germany
Total amount of reparations reduced even further; interallied debt
implicitly repudiated
Agreement rejected by U.S. congress, but Germany nevertheless sus-
pended all payments shortly thereafter (Hitler elected in early 1933)
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G Assessing Public Debt Sustainability
As in Bohn (1998), sustainability can be related to the intertemporal financing constraint that the govern-
ment faces. This relates the increase in public debt Dt to the primary fiscal balance PBt and the interest
rate r:42
Dt = (1 + r)Dt−1 − PBt (1)
Iterating this debt dynamics equation forward yields a transversality condition, also known as non-
Ponzi game condition:
lim
t→+∞
Dt
(1 + r)t
≤ 0 (2)
It would be verified, for instance, if debt grew slower than interest rates. When the transversality
condition holds, equation (1) can be rewritten in terms of the net present value of future primary surpluses:
Dt ≤
+∞∑
s=t+1
PBs
(1 + r)s−t
(3)
To test whether these relations hold, empirical studies run stationarity tests on fiscal variables. For
example, first of a prolific literature, Hamilton and Flavin (1985) conclude that the U.S. debt was sus-
tainable between 1962 and 1984 by showing that annual series of government debt and deficit were both
stationary. in line with this, we run stationarity tests on our series of government debt. We find that the
public debt was not stationary for the vast majority of the countries in our sample, and in some cases
not even I(1) (Table 4).43 Since our sample covers 1913–46, the sharp increases in public debt during
the World Wars could bias this finding. However, running the same stationarity tests on the interwar
sub-sample leads to comparable results. Last, to account for the limited number of annual observations
we have for each country (at most 33 years), we also run panel unit root tests. Table 5 shows the results
for the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test, as well as Choi (2001)’s Fisher-type tests, which allow for
unbalanced panels and country-specific autoregressive factors. They confirm that public debt was globally
unsustainable during the period.
Another strand of empirical studies uses cointegration techniques to test whether debt is sustainable.
Haug (1991) demonstrates that a sufficient condition for the transversality condition to hold is that the
primary deficit and debt series be cointegrated. We run cointegration tests using the fiscal series compiled
42. The same equation holds in nominal and real terms. The empirical literature general favors macroeconomic variables
in real terms. Deflating by a price index could however hide complacent monetary policies that help inflating debt away. In
this presentation, we omit stock-flow adjustments and suppose interest rates constant.
43. As a robustness check, we run the same tests on different debt series: in local currency units vs. U.S. dollars gold
equivalent, and for foreign vs domestic debt, finding each time broadly similar results.
54
Table 4: Unit root tests on debt in local currency
Notes: DF, ADF, PP, and KPSS stand for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests. nc and c denote without and with constant. ***, **, and * indicate rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level of confidence respectively, while the tests fail to reject it when the cell is
empty. The null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root, except for the KPSS test where it is that the series is stationary.
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Table 5: Panel unit root tests
Note: This table reports the p-values for each test, the null hypothesis being that all panels contain unit roots.
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by Mauro et al. (2015) and government revenue data from Mitchell (1998). Results are shown in Table 6.
Columns (2)–(3) report Engle-Granger tests for debt, primary balance and revenue as a percent of GDP,
while columns (4)–(5) report the same but for nominal amounts in local currency. We do not find any
evidence of cointegration. Additionally, we estimate Bohn equations to see whether the fiscal deficit is
negatively correlated with the level of debt in the previous year. For most countries of our sample, the
primary balance is at best weakly responsive to public debt. Lastly, since countries reformed their tax
systems during the period, we examine debt-to-revenue ratios and find them to be non-stationary as well,
confirming that debt was not sustainable.
Table 6: Cointegration Tests and Bohn Estimates
Notes: The Bohn coefficient is the estimator β in the Bohn equation Bt
Yt
= α+ β
Dt−1
Yt−1 + γ
Bt−1
Yt−1 . B/Y, R/Y, and D/Y are
respectively the primary balance, revenue, and debt ratios to GDP. ***, **, and * respectively indicate the 1, 5, and 10
percent level of confidence for statistical significance in column (1) and the Engle-Granger test rejection of the null
hypothesis that there is no cointegration in columns (2)-(5). Empty cells are for non-rejection and “na” for insufficient data
availability.
H Some Concepts of Network Analysis
The external debt network is formally a dynamic, directed graph whose nodes are the countries (i)1≤i≤n
and whose directed edges are the debts: Di→j,k,t, the outstanding debt lent by country i to country j on
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the k-th instrument at time t, expressed in gold equivalent. An aggregate version is the (simpler) network
composed of the bilateral debts Di→j,t =
∑
kDi→j,k,t.
44
The degree of a node is the number of nodes in direct connection and can be interpreted as the
number of countries directly dependent on a given country. In a directed graph, the in- and out-degrees of
a node are respectively the number of edges directed into and out of that node, in other words the number
of countries lending to and borrowing from a specific country. They can formally be written as:
Deg→i,t =
∑
j
δDj→i,t 6=0 , Degi→,t =
∑
j
δDi→j,t 6=0 (4)
where the Dirac function is δx =
{
1 if x
0 otherwise
. The degree can also be weighted by the size of each
connection—i.e., by the amount of outstanding debt. The average in- and out-degrees are simply the
average amount of outstanding debt per country.
The maximum k-core of the network is the sub-graph of countries with maximal degree.
Degree centrality is the unweighted in/out-degree normalized by the number of possible connections:
DegCentr→i,t =
1
nt − 1
∑
j
δDj→i,t 6=0 , DegCentri→,t =
1
nt − 1
∑
j
δDi→j,t 6=0 (5)
While it does not account for the amounts involved, it quantifies how many countries were exposed to a
given sovereign’s default or to a sudden stop from a given country.
Closeness to other nodes in the network is a measure of the importance of a node for the overall
network, rather than direct neighbors. If Hi→j,t is the hopcount (i.e., the length of the shortest path)
from country i to country j, we can compute measures of systemicity and exposure as the out- and
in-closeness:
Systemicityi,t =
(ni→,t − 1)2
nt − 1
∑
j 6=i
Hi→j,t
−1 , Exposurei,t = (n→i,t − 1)2
nt − 1
∑
j 6=i
Hj→i,t
−1 (6)
Since our graphs are in general not strongly connected and may have several disconnected components,
we apply Wasserman and Faust (1994)’s correction, attributing small components a smaller closeness
value. Thus, ni→,t and n→i,t are the number of reachable nodes from/to i. These two measures can
also be computed by replacing the hopcount with the distance between nodes; namely, the inverse of the
outstanding debt tying countries together.
44. To simplify the presentation, we keep all debt instruments at all time; there outstanding value is simply nil before they
are first issued or after they are fully amortized. At year t, the adjacency matrix is therefore At =
(
δDi→j,t 6=0
)
i,j,t
and the
number of active nodes is nt =
∑
imin
{
1;
∑
j δDi→j,t 6=0 + δDj→i,t 6=0
}
. The Dirac function δx is 1 if x and 0 otherwise.
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The betweenness represents the importance of a node as a vector of contagion. If Pj→i,t(k) is the
number of shortest paths from j to i that transit through k, then we have:
Betweennessk,t = Average
i,j
Pj→i,t(k)∑
` Pj→i,t(`)
(7)
Clustering is another source of systemic weakness. The existence of clusters hosting circular de-
pendencies is potentially conducive and amplificatory of shocks. To measure this, we rely on a clustering
coefficient that can be understood as the probability that two neighbors of a node are neighbors themselves.
The weighted, directed definition of this clustering coefficient is (Fagiolo 2007):
Clusti,t =
1∑
j,kDj→k,t
∑
j 6=i,k/∈{i,j}
3
√
Dj→i,tDi→k,tDk→j,t
Degi,t (Degi,t − 1)− 2Degi↔i,t (8)
The total degree is Degi,t = Degi→,t +Deg→i,t and Degi↔i,t is the number of nodes with which i forms a
simple loop.45
The central point of dominance is a measure of how much the network is vulnerable to a few nodes:
Dominancet =
1
nt − 1
∑
i
max
k
Betweennessk,t −Betweennessi,t (9)
45. A simple loop is one without node repetitions.
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